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ABSTRACT
Unexpected Arousal Suppresses Memory and Metamemory Predictions During Associative
Face-Name Recognition Task
by
Sameer Sabharwal-Siddiqi
Advisor: Dr. Elizabeth Chua
Successful recognition often depends on probabilistic estimation of memory-signal.
Arousal has been shown to offset the influence of heuristic evidence on memory prediction. We
conducted three experiments that tested whether arousal also suppresses predictions relevant to
memory confidence. Experiments employed associative face-name memory tasks that included
retrospective (Experiments 1 and 2) or concurrent (Experiment 3) judgements of confidence.
During test, subjects were presented with a masked-affective face on a subset of trials. By timing
the masked-affective face to precede a recognition judgement (Experiment 1), we replicated the
finding that unexpected arousal offsets the influence of heuristic evidence on expectations of
memory. However, by delaying the masked-affective cue to the post-decisional epoch
(Experiment 2) we observed that subliminal arousal suppressed retrospective estimates of
decision-making confidence. Critically, the effect was shown to be specific to confidence as it
was not confounded by differences in first-order memory-strength. Furthermore, since the only
difference between Experiments 1 and 2 was the timing of the masked-affective cue, we
demonstrated that unexpected arousal was attributed to either memory or confidence depending
on its timing with respect to response-selection. Finally, by timing the masked-affective cue to
precede an integrated judgement of recognition and confidence, we observed that subliminal
arousal also modulated concurrent estimates of decision-confidence (Experiment 3). However,
compared to its effect on retrospective confidence, subliminal arousal was shown to inflate rather
than suppress predictions of decision-confidence. This difference likely reflects the extent to
which internal performance-monitoring systems shift in bias over the course of decision-making.
Data from all experiments help to extend Bayesian and embodied models of cognition into the
domain of memory metacognition, or metamemory.
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Introduction
There is growing consensus regarding the Bayesian Brain hypothesis, or the notion that
neural computations are driven by dynamic weighting of incoming evidence against
expectations, or priors (Yon & Frith, 2021). Transient shifts in bodily arousal have been shown
to correlate with suppression of expectations, as reflected in a reduction of choice-bias, in
perceptual as well as mnemonic decision-making (de Gee et al., 2017, 2020). From a
neurobiological perspective, arousal is associated with the gain of prediction-error signals across
domains (Bastos et al., 2012), and cognitive appraisal of arousal may result in the emergence of
conscious feeling-states that motivate actions that reduce prediction-error (Barrett & Simmons,
2015; Seth & Friston, 2016). The purpose of this work is to test whether arousal also regulates
prediction-error signals relevant to memory confidence.
Experiments investigating memory confidence typically require subjects to make firstorder judgments of memory (e.g., “do you recognize this person?”) and second-order judgements
of confidence (e.g., “how confident are you in your decision?”). Although judgements of
confidence typically track first-order accuracy (Chua et al., 2009), they are influenced by distinct
heuristics, beliefs, and biases at the metacognitive level (Chua & Solinger, 2015; Koriat, 2012;
Koriat & Ackerman, 2009). As such, judgements of memory confidence are thought to reflect
the outcome of memory metacognition, or metamemory (Nelson, 1990). We hypothesize that
metamemory computations are driven, at least in part, by Bayesian predictive-coding
mechanisms. However, although arousal is associated with changes in the weighting of Bayesian
inferences relevant to perception and memory (de Gee et al., 2020) the influence of interoceptive
signals on metamemory predictions has yet to be tested. Therefore, since arousal may regulate
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the weight of predictive inferences across cognitive domains (Seth, 2013), we hypothesize that
metamemory predictions are likewise susceptible to the regulatory influence of arousal.
In the context of perceptual decision-making, unexpected arousal has been shown to
offset the influence of sensory noise on predictive estimates of uncertainty in a perceptual task
(Allen et al., 2016). The goal of the present work is to extend the general paradigm of Allen et al.
(2016) into the domain of memory and metamemory. Depending on the timing of subliminally
induced arousal, we expected subjects to misattribute unexpected arousal as a prediction-error
signal relevant to either memory or metamemory.
Arousal and Bayesian Prediction-Error
Traditional models of cognition reflect the intuition that sensation is primarily
feedforward in nature (Friston et al., 2013). Intuitively, interoception and perception result from
“bottom-up” signals that originate in either in the body or in sensory organs. However, Bayesian
theories propose that the brain is instead an “active-inference machine,” and that neural
representations are largely driven by “top-down” prediction signals (Knill & Pouget, 2004).
These signals correspond with the brain’s a priori hypotheses regarding the state of the world
(Seth & Friston, 2016). In a Bayesian framework, therefore, feedforward sensory signals are
understood to modulate existing predictions, or priors, in a relativistic manner (Yon & Frith,
2021). In other words, “bottom-up” inputs are compared against the output of “top-down”
prediction-signals and are therefore termed prediction-error signals.
Neuromodulatory brainstem nuclei are associated with the global gain-control of
prediction-error signals (Bastos et al., 2012). This gain-control mechanism permits adaptive
weighting of sensory-noise during high-noise conditions (Yon & Frith, 2021). While attempting
to navigate in a dark room, for example, incoming visual information is noisy and the relativistic
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weight associated with incoming evidence is reduced such that one relies more on predictions
while navigating. Critically, these brainstem nuclei are known to relay “bottom-up” signals
relating to both perception and interoception (Barrett & Simmons, 2015). Due to this crosstalk,
interoceptive signals such as arousal likely regulate the gain-control of prediction-error signals
across domains. As such, Arousal Prediction-Error (APE) may advance appraisal theories of
emotion (Seth, 2013). Indeed, cognitive attribution of arousal to prediction-error may result in
changes to affective state. These emotional changes may, in turn, motivate behaviors that reduce
mismatch between prediction and evidence (Barrett & Simmons, 2015; Seth & Friston, 2016).
There is growing neuroscientific evidence to support the hypothesis that arousal
modulates weighting of prediction-error against prior expectation (Allen et al., 2016; Friston et
al., 2013). For example, transient shifts in arousal, measured via pupillometry, were shown to
correlate with suppression of choice bias across both audition and memory (de Gee et al., 2017).
De Gee et al. (2017) recorded brain hemodynamic activity and pupil-dilation as subjects
performed perceptual and mnemonic decision-making tasks. They observed that transient
increases in pupil-dilation, timed to the onset of decision, correlated with activity in brainstem
regions such as Locus Coeruleus (LC) and suppression of memory and perception choice-bias.
These data are consistent with the hypothesis that arousal regulates the gain of brainstem nuclei
that signal prediction-error signals (Bastos et al., 2012), and are therefore consistent furthermore
with the view that that arousal regulates the weight prediction-error signals across domains (e.g.,
Arousal Prediction-Error or APE).
We hypothesize that the embodied nature of prediction-error weighting extends to
metamemory. As such, the goal of the present work is to test whether subliminal arousal
modulates predictive estimates relevant to both memory and confidence during mnemonic
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decision making. Once again, since memory and metamemory reflect different levels of
cognitive processing (Nelson, 1990), the goal is to demonstrate a modulation of metacognitive
prediction that is not trivially accounted-for by changes in first-order predictions relevant to
memory-strength.
Arousal and Familiarity
Successful recognition can be the result of either recollection (e.g., explicit recall of a
memory-target and its contextual associations) or a more general sense that the item has been
encountered in the past, called familiarity (Tulving, 1985). In experimental tasks, participants are
often asked to distinguish between “remember” responses, which map onto recollection, versus
“know” responses which map onto familiarity. There is debate as to whether their mechanistic
underpinnings are shared (for review, see Diana et al., 2006). According to the single-process
view, “know” versus “remember” responses reflect different points along a gradient of memorystrength (Squire & Wixted, 2015). In this view, weak memory is associated with “knowing”
whereas strong memory is associated with “remembering” (Wixted & Stretch, 2004). In the
alternative Dual-Process view, “remembering” responses map onto a threshold-based process of
recollection (Yonelinas et al., 1996). Familiarity, meanwhile, refers more specifically to heuristic
signal-based evidence of memory (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995).
One source of indirect evidence, fluency, may be particularly relevant to attribution of
arousal during a recognition decision (Goldinger & Hansen, 2005). In the context of recognition,
fluency refers to the speed and ease by which a cue is processed (Lanska et al., 2013). When
subjects experience inexplicable increments in fluency, perhaps due to subliminal facilitation or
improvement of processing-ease, they attribute the improvement as heuristic evidence of prior
encounter, or memory (Jacoby and Whitehouse,1989). In the Jacoby and Whitehouse experiment
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(1989), subjects were initially asked to memorize a list of words and were later tested on their
memory. During test, they were presented with words that were either novel lures or previously
encountered. Furthermore, these test words were primed with a briefly flashed word that either
matched in context (‘DOG-house’) or did not match in context (‘BANANA-house’). The
experimenters hypothesized that subjects would not be consciously aware of prime-words due to
their short presentation-time, but that matching-context primes would still facilitate cueprocessing in a subliminal manner. Consistent with this hypothesis, Jacoby and Whitehouse
observed that the matching-context prime increased the rate of perceived recognition even for
novel lures. This criterion-shift only occurred when subjects reported being unaware of the
briefly flashed prime words during memory test. As such, subjects likely attributed inexplicable
improvements in cue-fluency as evidence of memory.
The discrepancy between experienced and expected fluency has consequences for
recognition success. On the one hand, if fluency is higher than expected, then subjects may infer
that a partially recognized target is “Old” and therefore allocate further resources towards cue
identification. This was suggested by Rajaram (1993), as subjects partook in a recognition
experiment that queried subjects on whether memory was based in explicit “remembering” or
more heuristic “knowing.” Rajaram observed that matching-context subliminal primes induced a
criterion-shift towards recognition, as was observed by Jacoby and Whitehouse (1989).
However, this criterion-shift was observed only “know” and not “remember” responses. This
result suggests that inexplicable discrepancies in predicted versus experienced fluency
constitutes heuristic evidence of familiarity in the absence of recollection, which is consistent
with a Dual-Process view.
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The Rajaram (1993) data suggest that judgements of familiarity are influenced by a
relativistic comparison of expected and experienced fluency. More specifically, inexplicable
violations of expected fluency are attributed as shifts in the accumulation of signal-based
memory evidence. As such, this discrepancy-attribution hypothesis (Whittlesea & Williams,
2001) is consistent with the notion that neural representation of signal-to-noise are facilitated by
predictive-coding (Yon & Frith, 2021). Furthermore, unexpected arousal has been demonstrated
to suppress the influence of expected fluency on familiarity-based recognition (Goldinger &
Hansen, 2005), which is consistent with the theory that physiological signals suppress predictionerror signals across domains (Seth, 2013).
To investigate the relationship between arousal, fluency-discrepancy, and memory,
Goldinger & Hansen (2005) tested whether subjects misattributed unexpected arousal as a
fluency-discrepancy signal during attempted recognition. Subjects were initially required to
memorize a list of words, pictures, and faces. Across all three classes, stimuli were pre-classified
as being either “easy” or “difficult” (for example, “easy” faces belonged to celebrities, whereas
“difficult” faces belonged to anonymous medical students). Before the memory test, half of the
subjects were made aware that a subset of recognition attempts would be accompanied by a lowfrequency buzz. The other half was naïve to the buzz. Subjects in this “unaware group” were
later queried on their awareness of the buzz following memory test. While attempting
recognition of “difficult” memory targets, subjects in the unaware group misattributed the buzz
to memory. Critically, this effect was observed only for subjects in the unaware group who
remained naïve to the buzz throughout memory test. As such, Goldinger & Hansen (2005)
hypothesized that “difficult” trials corresponded with relatively low expectations of fluency and
that subjects in the unaware group misattributed unexpected arousal as a fluency-discrepancy
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signal. Finally, by timing the buzz to the first 1500ms of cue-onset, Goldinger & Hansen (2005)
showed that attribution of arousal to ease-discrepancy occurs relatively early, during initial cueprocessing.
Arousal and Confidence
Confidence is influenced by heuristic sources of evidence pertaining to the past decisionmaking experience (Hanczakowski et al., 2021). For example, decision-time on a dot-motion
discrimination task was associated with unidirectional shifts in confidence for both correct and
incorrect trials (Kiani et al., 2014). Furthermore, the observed association between decision-time
and confidence could not be explained by trial-to-trial fluctuations in sensory-noise. Given this
evidence, Kiani et al. (2014) concluded that confidence was based on a distinct metacognitive
evaluation of accuracy during the post-decisional epoch. This result extends to metamemory, as
decision-time (Koriat & Ackerman, 2010) and other heuristics pertaining to the decision-making
experience (Chua & Solinger, 2015) have been shown to exert a selective influence on
retrospective confidence. As such, retrospective judgements of confidence are unlikely to be
based on direct-access to first-order perceptual or mnemonic representations. Instead, they are
likely facilitated by a separate evaluation of evidence during the post-response epoch. Multiple
lines of evidence suggest that Bayesian predictive coding systems generate fast, automatic
estimates of decision-certainty during this epoch (Allen et al., 2016; Kiani et al., 2014).
The influence of arousal on confidence was tested in an experiment that employed a
masked-affective face (in a “disgust” expression) to subliminally arouse subjects prior to
perceptual discrimination of dot-motion (Allen et al., 2016). Subjects decided whether dotmovement was directed to either the left or right and subsequently provided a judgement of
confidence in their decision. Arousal levels were measured using pupillometry and mean peak
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pupil-dilation occurred at 2110ms post disgust-face presentation. Critically, owing to the 800ms
time limit on the discrimination task, peak arousal (as measured in pupil dilation) coincided with
subjects’ judgements of retrospective confidence. Allen et al. (2016) compared the effects of
arousal between low-noise and high-noise trials by varying the degree of motion coherence on a
trial-to-trial basis. The experimenters observed that the masked-face modulated retrospective
confidence judgements but did not affect decision accuracy or criterion. Arousal increased
confidence on noisy trials and decreased it on less noisy trials. As such, subjects misattributed
subliminal arousal to an increase or decrease in confidence depending on a priori predictions of
uncertainty. As such, the fast and relativistic effect of unexpected arousal on uncertaintyprediction is highly consistent with the theory of Arousal Prediction-Error (Seth, 2013).
In this work, we extend the masking-sequence and broad paradigm of Allen et al. (2016)
into the domain of memory and metamemory. As in Allen et al. (2016), we hypothesize that the
masked-affective cue will influence metacognitive judgements of confidence in a selective
manner. To test this hypothesis, however, it was necessary to delay the masked-affective cue to
arrive after response-selection. This is because our recognition task was longer in duration than
the discrimination task employed by Allen et al. (5s as opposed to 800ms) and timing the
masked-affective to arrive prior to recognition would therefore result in arousal arising
synchronously with recognition as opposed to confidence.
Arousal and Error-Awareness
The goal of Bayesian systems is to reduce prediction-error (Yon & Frith, 2021) and
attribution of Arousal Prediction-Error to emotion may facilitate behavioral responses that
reduce prediction-error (Seth, 2013). As such, this framework can account for why violations of
heuristic memory expectations are associated with the feeling of familiarity (Goldinger &
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Hansen, 2005). In this scenario, subjects may be naïve to the internal computations governing
predictive inference of memory (fluency heuristics etc.), but subjects are conscious of feeling
that a thing or person is familiar. This feeling may, in turn, motivate the recruitment of additional
cognitive resources so the subject can achieve recollection and reduce her mnemonic predictionerror (Whittlesea & Leboe, 2003). In Allen et al. (2016), arousal offset distinct metacognitive
predictions relevant to subjective uncertainty. Given this, one possibility is that attribution of
arousal to metacognitive prediction-error entails distinct changes in affective-state.
Experiments on error-awareness may afford lines of evidence to link arousal and
confidence with affect. Unlike confidence, which is typically understood to correspond with a
deliberative evaluation (Nelson, 1990), error-awareness is associated with the pre-reflexive sense
of a past decision being a mistake, and this feeling can emerge as early as 10ms after responseselection (Rabbitt et al., 1978; Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977). Despite this difference, errorawareness and confidence are not wholly unrelated, and error-awareness mechanisms may still
influence judgments of confidence. Indeed, a fast-automatic error-monitoring system might
contribute to judgements of confidence in a manner analogous to how fast-automatic processes
relevant to familiarity contribute to judgements of recognition (Yonelinas et al., 2010). In both
cases, active-inference mechanisms may rapidly encode expectations, or priors, based on
available heuristics (e.g., cue-fluency to memory or reaction-time to decision-certainty). This
hypothesis is consistent with the theory that Bayesian computations are fundamental to brain
function (Knill & Pouget, 2004) and the finding that arousal produces relativistic offsets to
predictive estimates of memory (Goldinger & Hansen, 2005) and confidence (Allen et al., 2016).
Conscious awareness of errors is associated with transient physiological changes (Veen et
al., 2004) and the error-related positivity (Pe) event-related potential (Wessel et al., 2011). The
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Pe, in turn, is associated with the function of neuromodulatory nuclei in the LC (Nieuwenhuis et
al., 2005). Once again, this population of brainstem neurons is theorized to regulate the gain of
prediction-error signals across domains (Bastos et al., 2012). Error-awareness is furthermore
correlated with activity in the Anterior Insular Cortex (AIC) (Klein et al., 2007). The AIC is
well-known as an integrative hub for cognitive and interoceptive information (Uddin et al.,
2017). Given this integrative function, the AIC is a likely site for the internal resolution of
“bottom-up” prediction-error signals against “top-down” predictions (Gu et al., 2013). Given
these lines of evidence, error-awareness likely corresponds with attribution of Arousal
Prediction-Error to the brain’s generative model of decision-certainty.
Tautologically, error-awareness can only occur after a decision has been made.
Furthermore, error-monitoring on a perceptual discrimination task was impaired when stimuli
were removed from the display after response-selection (Rabbitt & Vyas, 1981), which suggests
that error-awareness depends on feedback between prediction and evidence in the post-decisional
epoch. In other words, error-awareness is associated with “changes of mind,” or a shift in
evidence accumulation in favor of one choice to another (Resulaj et al., 2009). As such,
unexpected arousal during the post-decisional epoch may be attributed as a prediction-error
signal relevant to subjective uncertainty which may, in turn, contribute to downward shift in
confidence (Yeung & Summerfield, 2012).
Internal error-monitoring systems likely facilitate effective behavioral responses to
decision-making errors across domains (Ullsperger et al., 2010). Recognition is likewise a
decision-making process (the subject decides whether a cue is “Old” or “Novel”) and memory
confidence depends on the accumulation of evidence after response-selection (Koriat &
Ackerman, 2009). Therefore, given the wealth of evidence linking error-detection with arousal
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and interoception (for review, see Ullsperger et al., 2010), we hypothesize that corrective shifts
in memory during post-decisional period are facilitated by feedback between body and mind.
This hypothesis is suggested by earlier experiments investigating metamemory. In Chua et al.
(2006), activity in the Insula was shown selectively correlate with higher-order judgements of
confidence rather than first-order judgements of recognition. Furthermore, in Chua & BlissMoreau (2016), metamemory and interoceptive accuracy were found to be correlated between
individuals. Critically, judgements of confidence in both experiments were retrospective in
nature. As such, these results are consistent with the notion that memory decisions are subject to
embodied error-correction during the post-decisional epoch.
After a memory decision, therefore, we hypothesize that subjects will attribute
unexpected arousal to the brain’s generative prediction of certainty. More specifically, arousal
will be attributed as a prediction-error or “change of mind” signal (Yeung & Summerfield,
2012), such that subjective estimates of decision-confidence are reduced (e.g., for both “Old”
and “Novel” decisions). Crucially, this attribution depends on the accumulation of evidence after
response-selection. Indeed, performance-monitoring during response-selection is understood to
depend on a distinct “conflict-monitoring” system (Steinhauser et al., 2008). This system is
correlated with different patterns of neural activity. More specifically, online conflict-monitoring
is associated with the event-related negativity (ERN) as opposed to the Pe (Yeung et al., 2004),
and a lesser degree of activity in AIC (Ullsperger et al., 2010). From a Bayesian perspective,
“conflict-monitoring” is thought to reflect an online estimate of task-uncertainty or “likelihood to
fail,” and may facilitate the allocation of additional resources towards ongoing challenges
(Ullsperger et al., 2010). Since memory is also a decision-making process, this hypothesis is
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consistent with the finding that arousal offsets predictions of processing-fluency during
attempted recognition (Goldinger & Hansen, 2005).
Experimental Goals
We conducted three memory recognition experiments to test the hypothesis that arousal is
variably attributed as a prediction-error signal relevant to memory or confidence depending on
the time of the physiological signal with respect to decision-making. Furthermore, we tested the
secondary hypothesis that arousal is attributed to “conflict-monitoring” during concurrent
judgments of confidence and to “error-correction” during retrospective judgements of
confidence. All experiments employed the masked face cue paradigm from Allen et al. (2016),
and queried subjects on their memory and confidence during recognition test. However, the
structure of experiments varied with respect to timing of the masked-affective cue or the nature
of the confidence judgement.
In all experiments, subjects first encoded face-name pairs and were asked to respond to
whether they felt as though the given name “fit” its face. During subsequent recognition tests,
subjects were presented with face-name pairs that were either “intact,” meaning paired with the
same name as encoded, or “rearranged,” meaning a novel re-pairing of a previously encoded face
and name. In all experiments, subjects were asked to make a first-order memory decision (e.g.,
“is this face-name pair ‘intact’ or rearranged?”) and a second-order confidence decision (e.g.,
“how confident are you in your decision?”). Between experiments, we varied the structure of
these questions and their timing relative to the masked-affective cue.
In Experiment 1, the masked arousal cue arrived prior to both an initial recognition task
and a subsequent confidence judgment. As such, we expected Experiment 1 to replicate the
major result from Goldinger et al. (2004). More specifically, we expected that unexpected
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arousal would offset the influence of heuristic expectations on familiarity, as reflected by a
memory criterion-shift. In Experiment 2, the masked arousal cue arrived after the initial
recognition task and before the subsequent confidence judgment. Here, we expected that subjects
would misattribute arousal to post-decisional error-awareness or “changing-of-mind”
mechanisms (Yeung & Summerfield, 2012). In experimental terms, we expected that judgements
of decision-confidence would be suppressed if preceded by the masked disgust-face. Crucially,
we expected that arousal would influence a distinct meta-level computation of decision-making
confidence, and we therefore expected that the effect on confidence would not be moderated by
differences in first-order memory-strength.
Error-monitoring predictions are generated depend on post-decisional evidence
accumulation and are therefore generated after response-selection (Yeung & Summerfield,
2012). As such, we hypothesized that misattribution of unexpected arousal to error would be
constrained to the post-decisional epoch. We tested this hypothesis in Experiment 3, wherein the
masked-affective cue preceded an integrated recognition and confidence question. Since
judgements of confidence and recognition were made concurrently, subjects’ confidence
responses were assumed to be immune to error-monitoring mechanisms. As such, we expected
that arousal would not be attributed as error (e.g., as reflected by a suppression of decisionconfidence). However, we also did not rule-out an effect on confidence. Performance-monitoring
during decision-making is once again associated with task-uncertainty or “likelihood to fail”
estimates (Ullsperger et al., 2010; Yeung et al., 2004; Yeung & Summerfield, 2012). As such, we
inferred that subjects might misattribute unexpected arousal as a violation of online uncertainty
predictions and therefore as a gain in decision-confidence.
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Finally, we were interested in subjects’ responses to the question asked during encoding,
“does the name fit the face?” We hypothesize that face-name pairs judged to “fit” might be
encoded more strongly than those judged to not fit (Sperling et al., 2003). Following from this,
we predicted that attempts to recognize these stimuli during test might be accompanied by
differing levels of memory and metamemory expectation. Given how arousal is understood to
offset expectations in a relativistic manner (Allen et al., 2016; Goldinger & Hansen, 2005; Seth
& Friston, 2016), we considered that arousal might offset a priori expectations associated with
the class of “good-fit” face-name pairs.

Experiment 1
Methods
Participants
Participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Subjects were
directed to the experiment by clicking on the MTurk advertisement. Each participant provided
consent by clicking on a button on the computer, in a manner approved by the Human Research
Protection Program (HRPP) of the City University of New York (CUNY).
Participants were required to be United States residents and within the age-range of 1865. The age of participants ranged from 18 to 64 years (M= 34, SD = 9.5). 105 MTurk workers
(59 Males, 44 Females, two Other/Not Reported) participated in the experiment. Subjects spent
an average of 42 minutes on the task (SD = 9 minutes) and were paid $10-13 for their time. Any
participant who had completed the task was barred from repeating this or future iterations of the
experiment (e.g., Experiments 2 and 3).
Of the 105 subjects who participated in the task, three were excluded from further
analysis for not completing the task, and a further six subjects were removed for exhibiting poor
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performance on the memory task (d’ < 0). As such, 96 subjects were considered for further
analysis. No subjects were excluded for having an excessively high number of unusable trials (no
subject had >50% of trials deemed unusable). The criterion for defining unusable trials is defined
in the data pre-processing section.
Stimulus Material
All experiments were programmed in Javascript using the JS Psych framework. JS Psych
is a JavaScript plugin library that streamlines the process of programming browser-compatible
psychological experiments (de Leeuw, 2015). We used Cognition.run, a server customized for
use with the JS Psych framework, to host online experiments.
We employed 128 faces from the Chicago Face Directory (Ma, 2015). The selected faces
consisted of high-resolution male and female faces in a neutral expression. Of the 128 faces, 32
were used during each block of the memory task. Faces were furthermore gender balanced in
each block (16 Male and Female faces in each block). The Chicago Face Directory (CFD)
comprised a diverse set of faces (with contributors self-identifying as Black, Hispanic, White,
and Asian). Of the 128 faces employed in this experiment, 37/128 faces belonged to selfidentifying Asian people, 30/128 to self-identifying Hispanic people, 31/128 to self-identifying
Black people, and 30/128 to self-identifying White people. The CFD did not include a
description of the age of each face-contributor. However, it did include mean norm-rated ages
corresponding to each face (e.g., for how old each was perceived as). Among the CFD face
stimuli that were used in this experiment, the mean norm-rated age was 27.53 years (SD= 3.18
years, range = 12.81 years). Given the timing of our study in 2022, face stimuli were likely to be
perceived as belonging to millennials with birthdates in the 1990s.
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We collected age-appropriate name stimuli from the Department of Social Security’s
publicly available list of popular baby-names. We extracted the 100 most popular male and
female baby names from the year 1990. Names that existed in both male and female lists (e.g.,
Jordan) were removed. Furthermore, in cases where a phonetically similar names existed in a
single list (e.g., Sarah and Sara), we removed the less popular name from the list. Names were
assigned to faces in a gender appropriate manner. All participants studied the same list of facename pairs during encoding. During test, items were randomly assigned as “intact” or
“rearranged.” “Intact” face-name pairs were pairs that were seen together during the study.
“Rearranged” pairs consisted of a face that was paired with a name that had been paired with a
different face at study.
To induce arousal during memory test, we adapted a masked-affective face paradigm
from Allen et al. (2016). Masked-affective faces with either a disgust expression (arousal
condition) or a neutral expression (non-arousing condition). The choice to use disgust vs. neutral
faces was motivated by Allen et al. (2016), who used a similar manipulation in a perception and
confidence task. In Allen et al, (2016), masked disgust but not neutral cue-faces were shown to
induce physiological arousal in subjects, which is consistent with other findings relating disgust
with physiological arousal and insular activity (for review, see Chapman & Anderson, 2012).
Disgust and neutral faces were extracted from the Karolinska Directory of Emotional Faces
(KDEF) (Lundqvist, 1998).
The masking sequence consisted of three stages (see Figure 1A). A phase-scrambled
manipulation of the cue-face served as the forward mask. The phase-scrambled image lasted for
250ms and was followed by the brief presentation of a neutral or disgust cue-face (16ms). Prior
to each trial during memory test, the expression of the cue-face was determined probabilistically
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by a random “coin-flip” in the JS program. Given this randomization, the ratio of disgust cueface to neutral cue-face trials was not perfectly balanced. In Experiment 1, the mean ratio of
neutral to disgust trials was 1.02 (SD=.20). The cue-face was followed by a face in a neutral
expression for 100ms (also from the KDEF library), which served as the backward mask. Neutral
KDEF faces were used as backward masks. We implemented a programmatic check to ensure
that the same face was not used as both the neutral-cue and the backward mask. This was done to
prevent the same stimuli from being used as both the cue and backward mask.
Owing to the online nature of the study, it was not possible to directly record stimulus
duration-times on subjects’ monitors. Although the cue was set to be presented for one screen
refresh (on a 60 Hz monitor), we predicted that there might be variability in the actual display
times owing to differences in the type and condition of subjects’ monitors. Therefore, to directly
gauge subjects’ discrimination of the masked-affective face, we employed a follow-up perceptual
detection task (see Procedure).
Furthermore, the default JS Psych data-output system estimated stimulus durations using
internal computer feedback, and we used these estimates to infer between and within subject
variability in cue durations (see Data Pre-Processing). However, this estimate did not factor the
possibility of inflated stimulus-durations due to phosphor persistence, which is known to
influence older-generation LCD displays (Elze, 2010). Although display variability due to
persistence was presumed to be randomly distributed between subjects and neutral/disgust trial
subsets, our inability to directly record stimulus durations remains a limitation of this study.
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Figure 1: A masking sequence from Allen et al. (2016) was employed during memory test.
However, the timing of the sequence varied between experiments. (A) In Experiment 1, the
masking sequence occurred prior to recognition with confidence as a second judgment. (B)
In Experiment 2, the masked sequence occurred after recognition and prior to the
confidence judgment. (C) In Experiment 3, the masking sequence arrived prior to an
integrated recognition and confidence question.
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Procedure
The memory task consisted of four alternating study and test blocks, with 32 face-name
pairs in each block (128 pairs total). During study blocks, participants were instructed to
memorize face-name pairs and were asked to respond to the encoding question, “do you feel as
though the name “fits” the face?”. The purpose of this question was to encourage participants to
encode the face-name association rather than the face or name item in isolation (Sperling et al.,
2003). Subjects registered their decision regarding the face-name fit by entering either “f” or “n”
on their keyboards (corresponding to “fit” or “no fit” respectively). Face-name pairs were
presented for a fixed duration of 5000ms and subjects were asked to make a “fit”/“no fit”
judgement within this time-limit.
During recognition blocks, subjects viewed face-name pairs and were asked to respond
whether pairs were either “intact” or “rearranged” [Figure 1A]. Half of the face-name pairs were
“intact,” meaning that they were paired with the same face-name pairs that were studied. The
other half of the face-name pairs were “rearranged,” meaning that the face was paired with a
name that was paired with a different face at study. Trials involving intact and rearranged pairs
were interleaved using a pseudorandom procedure. More specifically, we employed the
randomization function within the JS Psych framework to shuffle trial vectors. In a second step,
participants were asked to register how confident they were in their decision using a sliding-scale
ranging from 0-100. There was a five-second time-limit to both recognition and confidence
questions, and the face-name pair remained on-screen throughout. Prior to each recognition
question, subjects were briefly presented with a masked cue-face, which was either a disgust or
neutral face. Disgust and neutral cue-faces were randomly interleaved on a trial-by-trial basis.
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Prior to the memory test, subjects partook in a brief practice version of the experiment to
solidify their understanding of the task. This task consisted of only eight face-name pairs but was
otherwise identical to the formal memory task, except that subjects were provided feedback on
the correctness of their recognition judgements after each practice trial to ensure they understood
the instructions (e.g., “You are correct, you judged a rearranged pair as rearranged.”).
After the memory test, subjects were tested on their ability to detect a masked cue-face
that was set to be presented for 16ms. During this follow-up task, subjects were presented with
50 iterations of the masking sequence in isolation and were asked to respond whether they
detected a disgust face on each trial. As was the case in the previous memory blocks, trials with
neutral and disgust cue-faces were randomly interleaved. This task was included to examine
whether subjects could detect the affective cue.
Data Pre-Processing
During test blocks, subjects were required to make a recognition judgement and a
subsequent confidence judgement. If the subject failed to make a decision during the five-second
time-limit, to either or both of these questions, then the trial was deemed unusable and excluded
from further analysis. 523/13184 trials across all participants were removed due to being
associated with one or two non-decisions. For a given subject, an average of 5.08 trials were
removed (SD = 6.74).
Although the duration of the affective face-cue was programmatically set to be 16ms,
there was some variation in the actual duration of the cue on individual computer systems. This
variation may have been due to hardware limitations such as memory-lag and variable screenrefresh rates. While being unable to limit these sources of variation, we were able to obtain a
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more accurate estimate of the actual cue presentation duration using feedback from subjects’
graphics systems.
For some subjects, the distribution of recorded presentation durations was right tailed
with some outlier durations exceeding 100ms. As such, we removed trials associated with outlier
cue presentation durations greater than 1.5 times the interquartile range. In Experiment 1, this
resulted in the removal of trials associated with cue durations greater than 47ms. Given this
criterion, 203/13184 trials were deemed to be unusable. For a given subject, an average of 2.14
trials were removed due to excessive cue-duration (SD = 4.49).
Finally, we tallied the number of useable trials for each subject. If a subject had over half
their trials (>64 trials) excluded, then this subject would be excluded from further analysis.
However, no subjects in Experiment 1 had >64 unusable trials.
Hypothesis Testing
We carried out individual participant measures of recognition-performance (d’) and
recognition-criterion (c-criterion) using the R package psycho (Makowski, 2018). Each signal
detection measure was calculated twice for each subject – once for the subset of neutral cue-face
trials and again for the subset of disgust cue ace trials.
We furthermore computed a by-participant measure of metacognitive sensitivity (metad’/d’), once again for subsets of neutral and disgust cue-face trials, using the R package metaSDT
(Kristensen et al., 2020). The ratio, meta-d’/d’ provided a measure of second-order
metacognitive efficiency relative to first-order signal-detection accuracy (Maniscalco & Lau,
2012). This ratio describes differences in metacognitive accuracy that are not trivially accounted
for by differences in first-order recognition accuracy (e.g., differences in d’).
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In total, therefore, we computed three measures of task-performance (d’, c, and metad’/d’) for subsets of neutral cue-face and disgust cue-face trials, for all subjects. After removing
outliers (> 1.5 * IQR), we performed paired t-tests to investigate whether neutral versus disgust
means were significantly different across subjects. As such, we conducted a single paired t-test
for each of the three statistics (d’, c, and meta-d’/d’).
After determining the presence of neutral versus disgust differences for each of these
three statistics, we investigated whether observed differences were moderated by additional byparticipant variable. In Experiment 1, there was only one additional by-participant variable of
interest: subject’s discrimination of the disgust-face during the follow-up detection task
(hereafter, Detection-d’). We initially fit a family of mixed-effects models predicting individual
participant statistics (one model for d’, c-criterion, and meta-d’/d’ each). In Experiment 1, the
base model included one random-effect, subject, and two fixed-effects, Cue-Affect and
Detection-d.’ If the t-test had revealed a significant difference between neutral and disgust-cue
trial subsets, then we expected to observe Cue-Affect as a significant main-effect. We proceeded
to fit a model with the interaction term between Cue-Affect and Detection-d’ and reported
whether the interaction term explained the variance to a significant extent.
These analyses were limited by the indirectness of computing individual participant
statistic (e.g., d’) and then proceeding to infer group-level differences. Indeed, one limitation
with this approach is the risk of Type I error inflation (Murayama et al., 2014). Another
limitation is that descriptive statistics were weighted equally across subjects, even though the
number of useable trials varied between from 64/128 to 128/128 trials.
Similar statistical issues complicated the reliability of meta-d’/d’. As a prerequisite to
calculating meta-d’/d’ we partitioned each subjects’ data into confidence-bins (low, medium, and
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high confidence). However, some subjects reported a limited range of confidence values, such
that there were few to zero observations in one or more confidence-bins. This may have resulted
in unreliable meta-d’/d’ values. An additional challenge to reliability stemmed from the fact that
many of our subjects performed near-chance on the memory recognition task (14/96 subjects
were associated with d’ scores < 0.5), and meta-d’/d’ is known to be unreliable when modelling
near-chance first-order performance (Guggenmos, 2021).
To directly interrogate group-level differences in memory and metamemory accuracy, we
adopted a logistic mixed-effect approach recommended by Murayama et al. (2014). We used the
R package lme4 to carry-out mixed-effect modelling (Bates et al., 2015), and the package
lmerTest to estimate p-values of parameters in mixed-effects model by employing Satterthwaite's
method for approximating degrees of freedom (Kuznetsova et al., 2017). Multilevel randomeffects within the model were subject and test-item. The binary outcome variable was TrialSuccess. Values of 0 corresponded with either a failure to recognize old/intact pairs or a false
recognition of an otherwise novel/rearranged pairs (in signal-detection terms, to Misses and
False-Alarms). Trial-Success values of 1, meanwhile, corresponded with successful recognition
or rejection (Hits and Correct-Rejections).
We proceeded to carry-out parameter selection by testing the influence of four candidate
parameters: Cue-Affect, Confidence, Item-History, and Face-Fit. The binary variable Cue-Affect
coded for the emotion of the masked-affective cue (0 for neutral, cue-face 1 for disgust cueface). The continuous variable Confidence corresponded with the subject’s mean-centered
confidence judgement. Trials associated with outlier confidence values (|2.5sd|>) were removed
prior to model-fitting. The binary variable Item-History coded for the status of the face-name
pair at test (0 for novel or rearranged pairs, 1 for old or intact pairs). Finally, the binary variable
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Face-Fit coded for whether the encountered face during memory test was previously judged to
“fit” it’s given name during encoding (0 for faces that were not previously judged to fit, 1 for
faces that were previously judged to fit).
During model fitting, the observed strength of these parameters was used to infer cueinduced differences in recognition accuracy, criterion, and metacognitive efficiency. More
specifically, the strength of the main effect of Cue-Affect (0 For neutral 1 for disgust) on
Accuracy (0 for incorrect, 1 for correct) revealed whether the masked disgust-face was associated
with changes in recognition accuracy. Meanwhile, the interaction between Cue-Affect and ItemHistory (0 for rearranged, 1 for intact) revealed whether the masked disgust-face was associated
with changes in recognition-bias. For example, it might be the case that the disgust-cue increased
accuracy for old/intact targets (Item-History value of 0) but decreased it for novel/rearranged
targets (Item-History value of 1). Such a cross-over interaction would be indicative of liberal
criterion-shift, as subjects are more likely to declare recognition regardless of whether the
memory target is old. Finally, the strength of the interaction between Cue-Affect and Confidence
revealed whether the masked disgust-face was associated with changes in the predictive accuracy
of retrospective confidence on accuracy, or metacognitive accuracy.
In the case that the best-fitting model included all four parameters (as main-effects or
within interaction terms), we proceeded to stratify the four-parameter mixed-effects model into
two three-parameter models. This was done so as to better understand the nature of complex
three and four-way interactions. After stratifying by Face-Fits (e.g., generating two models
corresponding with Face-Fits values of either 0 or 1), the resulting models included the three
remaining parameters, namely Cue-Affect, Confidence, and Item-History. These three remaining
parameters were necessary for revealing whether the masked-affective cue influenced
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recognition accuracy, criterion, or metacognitive efficiency. As such, we were interested in
whether Face-Fits moderated the influence of the masked disgust-face on memory and/or
metamemory behavior.
Results
Individual Participant Analyses of Prime Detection
On the disgust-face detection follow-up experiment, subjects’ mean d’ was .98 (SD=.79).
A one-sample t-test revealed that the sample Detection-d’ mean was significantly different from
0, t(95)=12.21, p<.001.
Individual Participant Analyses of Memory Recognition and Metamemory Performance
We first examined mean d’, c, and meta-d’/d’ values between neutral and disgust-cue
trial subsets, for all subjects. Outlier data-points were removed prior to calculation of means.
Outliers were defined as points outside 1.5 * the interquartile-range. Outlier exclusion led to the
removal of five subjects prior to calculation of d’ means, six subjects prior to calculation of ccriterion means, and 15 subjects prior to calculation of meta-d’/d’ means. There was no
significant difference in d’ between disgust-cue (M = 1.11; SEM = .07) and neutral cue trials
(M=1.07, SEM= 0.06), t(90) = .97, p = .34 [Figure 2A]. However, disgust cue-face trials were
associated with a greater c-criterion value (M=-.16, SEM = .04) than neutral cue-face trials (M=.24, SEM = 0.04), t(89)= 2.8, p<0.001 [Figure 2B]. Note that one-sample t-tests revealed that ccriterion values for disgust and neutral trials were less than 0, indicating that overall participants
had a bias to call face-name pairs intact. However, in the disgust cue trials, participants exhibited
less of a bias to call a face-name pair intact. Turning to metamemory performance, there was no
significant difference in meta-d’/d’ between disgust-cue (M = .51; SEM = 0.12) and neutral-cue
trials (M=.25, SEM=.40), t(80) = 0.61, p = .54 [Figure 2C].
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Figure 2: Experiment 1. Neutral versus Disgust Difference in By-Participant Statistics of Task-Performance,
(A) There were no differences in discrimination (d’) for neutral vs. disgust faces. (B) Participants were biased
(c-criterion) towards calling stimuli “intact,” but in the disgust condition, participants were relatively more
biased to say “rearranged.” (C) There were no differences in metacognitive efficiency (meta-d’/d’) for neutral
vs. disgust faces. *p<0.05.

Using an exploratory mixed effects modeling approach, we proceeded to interrogate
whether Cue-Affect and participants’ d’ scores on the disgust-face detection task (Detection-d’),
and their interaction, predicted individual participant differences in d’, c-criterion, or meta-d’/d’.
The model included subject as a random between-subject effect. All best-fit models predicting
for d’, c-criterion and meta-d’/d’ included two main-effects parameters: Cue-Affect and
Detection-d’ [Table A1]. In all three cases, the inclusion of the third interaction parameter, CueAffect*Detection-d’, failed to improve model-fit for all.
Turning to the two-parameter model predicting c-criterion, we replicated results from
paired t-test analysis of individual participant performance-metrics [Figure 2] as Cue-Affect was
shown to explain individual participant variance in c-criterion to a significant extent (β=.07,
p<.01). However, Cue-Affect failed to explain a significant amount of variance in the mixedeffects models predicting d’ or meta-d’/d’. Interestingly, Detection-d’ was a significant predictor
of d’ in the recognition task (β=0.34, p<.001). In other words, subjects’ perceptual discrimination
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accuracy of masked disgust-faces was positively correlated with accurate signal-detection during
the recognition task.
Trial-level Analyses of Memory and Metamemory Performance
Using an exploratory mixed effects modeling approach, we examined the effects of (CueAffect, Confidence, Item-History, and Perceived Face Fit, and all possible interactions on Test
Accuracy. The model included two-random effects: subject and test-item. The best-fitting model
included four fixed-effects (Cue-Affect, Confidence, Item-History, and Perceived Face Fit), all
possible interactions, and two-random effects (subject and test-item) [Table A2]. Exploratory
models did not incorporate a correction for multiple comparisons.
The only significant main-effects were Confidence (β=1.02, p<.001) and Face-Fits
(β=.75, p=.002). The main effect Confidence is indicative of metamemory because confidence
predicts accuracy. There was only one significant interaction effect, Item-History*Perceived
Face Fit (β=2.43, p<.001). However, we acknowledged that this model might suffer from
potential overparameterization. To remedy this problem, we carried-out a secondary analysis in
which we partitioned our data based on the value of Face-Fits parameter. Taking an exploratory
modeling approach, we examined the best fitting models for Face-Fit trials and No Face-Fit
trials separately [Table A3]. The best fitting model for the No Face-Fits strata included three
parameters (Cue-Affect, Confidence, and their interaction), of which only Confidence was
revealed to explain the variance to a significant extent (β=1.02, p<.001). For the Face-Fits strata,
the best-fit model included seven parameters, four of which were significant. This model was
associated with the highest R2 and conditional R2 values of all fitted models [Table A3].
Significant parameters were Confidence (β=1.03, p<.001), Item-History (β=2.86, p<.001), and
the interactions Item-History*Cue-Affect (β=.72, p=.006; Figure 3) and Confidence*Item-History
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(β=1.01, p=.001, Figure 4). The Cue-Affect*Item-History interaction was driven by higher
accuracy for rearranged trials with disgust versus neutral cue trials, and lower accuracy for intact
trials with disgust vs. neutral trials [Figure 3]. In other words, the disgust-cue was associated
with a conservative criterion-shift, or an increased likelihood of correctly declaring rearranged
pairs as rearranged and incorrectly declaring intact targets as rearranged. Evidence of this
criterion-shift was revealed by the individual participant analysis (c-criterion). However, triallevel analysis revealed that this shift was constrained to trials associated with a face that the
subject had previously judged to “fit” its paired name during encoding. The Confidence*ItemHistory interaction was driven by better metacognitive accuracy for intact-trials, specifically for
high-accuracy/high-confidence trials [Figure 4]. However, the difference in metacognitive
accuracy may be trivially accounted-for by higher recognition accuracy among intact trials.

Figure 3: Experiment 1. Interaction between Cue-Affect and Item-History
within the Face-Fit stratum. The masked disgust-face suppressed a liberal
recognition bias in the Face-Fit stratum.
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Figure 4: Experiment 1. Interaction between Confidence and Item-History within
the Face-Fit stratum. Above-mean confidence ratings better predicted accuracy
for intact as opposed to rearranged trials.

Discussion
When presented immediately before the recognition judgment, a masked affective cue
changed participants’ recognition-bias, but not their or metacognitive efficiency. Our participants
showed an overall liberal memory-criterion (i.e., they were more likely to call face-name pairs
intact), and group level modeling showed this was primarily for face-names that were judged as
“good fits.” However, the masked disgust-face suppressed subjects’ tendency of liberally
declaring recognition compared to masked neutral faces, such that in the disgust condition
participants were more likely to judge a face-name pair as “rearranged.”
This result is broadly consistent with the notion that arousal correlates with suppresion of
prediction bias (de Gee et al., 2020) and is more specifically consistent with the finding that
unexpected arousal during cue-processing offsets the influence heuristic expectations on
recognition (Goldinger & Hansen, 2005). As in Goldinger & Hansen (2005) we hypothesized
that arousal offset predictions of relative processing-ease associated with a specific sub-class of
stimuli (e.g., with “good fit” face stimuli).
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However, arousal has also been shown to modulate predictions relevant to decisionconfidence (Allen et al., 2016). Therefore, since recognition is also a decision-making process
(the subject decides whether a cue is “Old” or “Novel”) and since meta-level evaluations of
confidence are theorized to occur during the post-decisional epoch (Chua & Solinger, 2015;
Kiani et al., 2014), we hypothesized that unexpected arousal after response-selection would
influence predictions relevant to confidence rather than memory. We test this hypothesis in
Experiment 2 by the delaying the masked-affective cue to the post-decisional epoch. As
expected, the masked disgust-face was shown to modulate second-order judgements of decisionconfidence in a manner that was not confounded by differences in first-order judgments of
memory.
Finally, subjects’ perceptual-discrimination of the masked disgust-face was generally
higher than expected. However, performance on the follow-up detection task (Detection-d’) did
not moderate the influence of the masked disgust-face on c-criterion. In other words, Detectiond’ did not moderate the conservative criterion-shift associated with the disgust-face.
Furthermore, perceptual discrimination of emotional faces is known to vary widely depending on
attentional constraints (Pessoa, 2005) and above-average detection is not necessarily indicative
of awareness (Esteves & Öhman, 1993; Maxwell & Davidson, 2004). Therefore, we
hypothesized that some subjects may have robust perceptual discrimination while still being
naïve to the cue during memory test. In Experiment 2, therefore, we tested this hypothesis by
directly querying subjects on their awareness of the masked disgust-face after memory-test.
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Experiment 2
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited via Amazon MTurk in a manner identical to Experiment 1. A
total of 100 MTurk workers (72 Males, 28 Females) participated in the experiment and were paid
$13-15. The age of participants ranged from 19 to 61 (M= 36, SD = 9.6). Subjects spent an
average of 40 minutes on the task (SD= 11 minutes) and were paid $10-13.
Of the 100 participants who completed the experiment, only 84 subjects were included in
the analyses. One subject did not complete the experiment, 14 exhibited poor performance on the
memory task (d’ < 0), and one had >64 invalid trials (e.g., trials associated with a non-decision
and/or an excessive cue-duration).
Stimulus Materials
The procedure for generating and matching face and name stimuli prior to memorization
and test was identical to that used in Experiment 1. The stimuli employed in the masking
sequence were likewise identical to the one employed in Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, the
mean ratio of neutral to disgust faces was .98 (SD =.17).
Procedure
The structure of the memory task was identical to that of Experiment 1 albeit for one
important difference. In Experiment 2, the masking sequence arrived after the initial recognition
question and before the subsequent confidence query (see Figure 1B). As such, subjects were not
presented with the arousal stimulus prior to initial processing of the recognition-cue.
The follow-up task that tested subjects’ detection of the disgust-cue was furthermore
replicated from Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, however, subjects were directly queried on their
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awareness of the arousal stimulus immediately after the last test block and before the follow-up
perceptual detection task. Subjects were asked to write, in a few sentences, what they
remembered seeing amongst the “flickering faces” during memory test. In a subsequent
multiselect multiple choice question, subjects were presented with seven emotions and asked to
click on the emotions that they remembered seeing amongst the flickering faces. There were two
correct options (neutral, disgust) and five incorrect lures (sad, happy, fearful, surprised, and
angry).
Data Pre-Processing
651/10752 trials were removed because the cue duration time exceeded 40ms.
Participants experienced cue-durations >40ms on an average of 6.58 trials (SD= 10.06).
Furthermore, 840/10752 trials were removed because the subject failed to make a decision on
either the memory or confidence question. Subjects failed to make a decision on an average of
7.27 trials (SD=15.05 trials).
Hypothesis Testing
Trial-level mixed-effects modelling of performance was carried out in a manner identical
to Experiment 1. However, we were interested in understanding whether subjects’ performance
was moderated by an additional factor: participant’s subjective awareness of the disgust-cue. We
determined whether each participant was able to correclty report having had seen a “disgust”
face, and coded this report in the by-participant parameter, Disgust-Awareness (0 for “unaware,”
1 for “aware”).
As such, individual participant level of performance was carried out in a similar manner
to Experiment 1. Owing to the addition of an by-participant parameter, our base models for
individual participant statistics (d’ etc.) included three as opposed to two fixed effect (Cue-
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Affect, Detection-d’, and Disgust-Awareness). We then fit a model that included two-parameter
interaction terms, Cue-Affect*Detection-d’, and Cue-Affect*Disgust-Awareness. We were
interested in whether either or both of these two individual participant variables moderated the
effect of the affective-cue on performance.
Results
Individual Participant Analyses of Prime Detection
On the disgust-face detection follow-up experiment, subjects’ mean d’ was .69 (SD= .78).
A one-sample t-test revealed that the sample Detection-d’ mean was significantly different from
0, t(83)= 2.59, p=.01.
After the memory test, however, only 11 subjects reported having had seen a face in a
“disgust” expression during the multi-option query of subjective awareness. Furthermore, only
one subject correctly selected on the “disgust” option without also selecting lure options
(“surprised,” “happy,” etc.).
Individual Participant Analyses of Memory Recognition and Metamemory Performance
Prior to calculating individual participant measures of task-performance (d’, c, and metad’/d’) across neutral and disgust-cue trial subsets, we removed outliers in a manner similar to
Experiment 1 (1.5 * IQR method). Outlier exclusion led to the removal of three subjects prior to
calculation of d’ means, six subjects prior to calculation of c-criterion means, and 11 subjects
prior to calculation of meta-d’/d’ means. There was no significant difference in d’ between trials
associated with a masked disgust-face (M= .83, SEM= .07) and neutral-face (M= .90, SEM=.08),
t(80)= -0.96, p= 0.34 [Figure 5A]. Likewise, there was no significant difference in c-criterion
between disgust-cue (M=-.18, SEM= 0.05) and neutral-cue trials (M= -0.18, SEM= 0.05),
t(77)=0.30, p= 0.76 [Figure 5B]. Finally, turning to metamemory performance, there was no

33

differences in meta-d’/d’ between masked disgust-face (M=-.07, SEM=.16) and masked neutralface trials (M=.35, SEM=.33), t(72)=, p= 0.23 [Figure 5C].

Figure 5: Experiment 2. Neutral versus Disgust Difference in by-participant Statistics of TaskPerformance, (A) There were no differences in discrimination (d’) for neutral vs. disgust faces. (B) There
were no differences in recognition criterion (c-criterion) between neutral vs. disgust faces. (C) There were
no differences in metacognitive efficiency (meta-d’/d’) for neutral vs. disgust faces.

We proceeded to implement mixed-effects models predicting variance in d’, c-criterion,
and meta-d’/d’ with one within-subject (Cue-Affect) and two between-subject parameters
(Detection-d’ and Disgust-Awareness). We fit two families of models, one included only maineffects, and the other additionally included the interaction terms Cue-Affect*Detection-d’ and
Cue-Affect*Disgust-Awareness. None of the parameters were shown to predict individual
participant differences in any of the three response-metrics. Furthermore, the interaction terms
did not improve model fit for any outcome variable [Table A4].
Trial-level Analyses of Memory Recognition Performance
The best-fitting model predicting accuracy included all four candidate parameters (CueAffect, Confidence, Item-History, and Perceived Face-Fit) [Table A5]. This best-fitting model
included two significant main-effects: Confidence (β=1.01, p<.001) and Face-Fits (β= 0.72,
p<.001). It included three significant two, three, and four-way interactions (one of each). The
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two-way interaction was Item-History*Face-Fits (β= 2.72, p<.001). The three-way interaction
was Item-History*Perceived-Face-Fit*Confidence (β= 1.01, p=.043). Finally, the four-way
interaction was Item-History*Face-Fit*Confidence*Cue-Affect (β= 1.01, p=.018). To better
understand the nature of these interactions, especially the four-way interaction, we proceeded to
stratify the data according to Face-Fits variable.
Taking an exploratory modeling approach, we examined the best fitting models for FaceFits and No Face-Fits trials [Table A6]. For the No Face-Fits strata, the best-fitting model
included Cue-Affect and Confidence but not Item-History. Among all possible main-effects and
interactions, only the main-effect Confidence was determined to explain the variance to a
significant extent (β= 1.02, <.001).
For the Face-Fits strata, the best-fit model included all three parameters (Confidence,
Item-History, and Cue-Affect). The model included two significant main effects: Confidence (β=
1.02, <.001) and Item-History (β= 2.92, <.001). The model included one significant two-way
interaction, Item-History*Confidence (β= 1.01, p=.004), and one significant three-way
interaction Item-History*Confidence*Cue-Affect (β= .99, p=.033). Similar to Exp. 1, the
Confidence*Item-History interaction was driven by an association between above-mean
confidence and more robust metacognitive accuracy for intact trials compared to rearranged trials
[Figure 7]. Once again, we infer that is likely trivially accounted-for by the higher recognitionaccuracy for intact as opposed to rearranged trials.
To better understand the Item-History*Confidence*Cue-Affect interaction, we examined
intact and rearranged trials separately. For rearranged pairs, there was a similar confidenceaccuracy relationship for neutral- and disgust-cue trials [Figure 6A]. However, for intact trials,
there was a different confidence-accuracy relationship for neutral- and disgust-cue trials [Figure
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6B], such that higher confidence was associated with higher accuracy, and lower confidence was
associated with lower accuracy for neutral compared to disgust cue trials.

Figure 6: Experiment 2. Three-way interaction between Item-History, Confidence, and CueAffect in the Face-Fit stratum, A: For rearranged trials, no difference in metacognitive
sensitivity was observed. B: For intact trials, the disgust-face was associated with a reduction
in metacognitive accuracy.

Figure 7: Experiment 2. Interaction between Confidence and Item-History within the Face-Fit
stratum. Above-mean confidence ratings better predicted accuracy for intact as opposed to
rearranged trials.
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Discussion
By delaying the masked-affective cue to the post-decisional epoch in Experiment 2, we
hypothesized that subliminal arousal would modulate meta-level predictions of decisionconfidence rather than first-order predictions of memory-strength (as was observed in
Experiment 1). Trial-level regression analysis supported this hypothesis. In a specific subset of
trials (intact trials accompanied by “good-fit faces”), the masked-disgust face was associated
with a reduction in metacognitive estimates of decision-confidence. Compared to the neutralface, the disgust-face was associated with relatively lower confidence for high-accuracy trials
and relatively higher confidence for low-accuracy trials. Critically, this reduction in
metacognitive accuracy was observed for both high-accuracy recognition decisions and lowaccuracy novelty decisions, which suggests that the effect of arousal on confidence was not
moderated by first-order estimates of memory-strength.
As in Experiment 1, the effect of the disgust-face on behavior was constrained to a subset
of trials. As such, we inferred that this subset of trials was associated with divergent expectations
of decision-certainty and that subliminal arousal suppressed these divergent predictions. This
inference follows from the notion that arousal regulates the weighting of prediction-error across
domains (Bastos et al., 2012; Seth, 2013).
Retrospective judgements of confidence are influenced by secondary heuristics
associated with the decision-making experience (Chua & Solinger, 2015; Siedlecka et al., 2016).
Critically, heuristics such as decision-time have been shown to correlate with overall accuracy at
the multi-trial level while exerting an independent influence on confidence at the single-trial
level (Kiani et al., 2014). Indeed, Kiani et al. (2014) observed that low decision-times were
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associated with high-accuracy (across trials) but that low decision-time still produced linear
shifts in confidence for both correct and incorrect first-order decisions.
Extending from this, we infer that intact “good-fit face” trials were associated with a
similar heuristic (e.g., a heuristic that was correlated but not equivalent to first-order accuracy).
We propose that subliminal arousal offset the influence of this heuristic on second-order
estimates of decision-confidence. Since intact face-name pairs were holistically judged to “fit”
one another during encoding, we hypothesize that the heuristic pertained to the fluency of these
recognition-cues and we explore several possibilities in the General Discussion.
Finally, since subjects’ misattributed arousal as a suppression of decision-confidence and
therefore as error, we hypothesized that the misattribution involved post-decisional errormonitoring systems (Yeung & Summerfield, 2012). This possibility is supported by evidence
suggesting that error-awareness is embodied in feedback between body and mind (Ullsperger et
al., 2010). Critically, error-awareness is thought to depend on post-decisional evidence
accumulation (Rabbitt & Vyas, 1981). In Experiment 3, therefore, we tested the hypothesis that
subliminal arousal would not be misattributed as error if it arrived before as opposed to after
decision-making. To test this hypothesis, we employed an integrated judgement of recognition
and confidence in Experiment 3 (two-sided confidence response) to measure subjects’ decisionconfidence concurrently with recognition.
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Experiment 3
Method
Participants
18 subjects were recruited via Amazon MTurk in a manner similar to the one employed
in Experiments 1 and 2. An additional 82 subjects were recruited via Prolific
(https://www.prolific.co/). As such, a total of 100 subjects participated in the task. The age of
participants ranged from 18 to 60 (M=32, SD = 9.8). Participants spent an average of 38.61
minutes on the task (SD = 9.90 minutes).
Of the 100 subjects who participated in the task, two subjects were excluded from further
analysis for not completing the task. Furthermore, nine subjects were excluded for failing to
detect the memory-target (d’ below 0) and one subject was excluded for having >64 invalid
trials. As such, 88 subjects were included in the final analysis.
Stimulus Materials
The procedure for generating and matching face and name stimuli prior to memorization
and test was identical to that usead in Experiments 1 and 2. The stimuli employed in the masking
sequence was likewise identical to the one employed in Experiments 1 and 2. In Experiment 3,
the mean ratio of neutral to disgust cue-faces was .99 (SD=.16).
Procedure
The structure of the memory task was near-identical to that of Experiment 1. As in
Experiment 1, the arousal stimulus arrived prior to judgements of memory recognition. However,
unlike Experiment 1, the recognition question in Experiment 2 incorporated a judgement of
confidence. Subjects were presented with a two-sided slider below the recognition-cue. Each side
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of the slider corresponded with a recognition-decision (intact on the left and rearranged on the
right). A cursor was preset to the middle of the slider prior to each memory test question.
Subjects were instructed to adjust the slider to either the left or the right depending on
whether they felt that the face-name pair was intact or rearranged. Subjects were instructed to
move the cursor to a small or large degree depending on their confidence. As such, moving the
slider all the way to either pole corresponded with 100% confidence. The trial was registered as a
non-decision if a subject failed to adjust the sliding cursor.
In cases where subjects were minimally confident, they were able to avoid making
recognition decisions by not adjusting the slider at all. However, since low confidence guesses
were unavoidable in Experiments 1 and 2, and since these low-confidence decisions may be
influenced by arousal, we encouraged subjects in Experiment 3 to make low confidence guesses
when unsure. During the initial practice questions, therefore, subjects were provided with the
following feedback when they opted not to adjust the slider “You responded UNSURE. It’s OK
to be unsure, but you should also feel free to make a low-confidence guess.” Finally, in
Experiment 3, subjects were queried on their awareness of the disgust-cue using the same
questions employed in Experiment 2. Afterwards, subjects participated in the disgust-face signaldetection task employed in Experiments 1 and 2.
In Experiment 3, finally, we were interested in whether any effect of the disgust-cue was
moderated by individual differences in interoceptive sensitivity. This possibility is inspired by
the finding of a high-degree of correlation between individuals’ metamemory and interoceptive
sensitivity (Chua & Bliss-Moreau, 2016). There is a possibility that metamemory systems are
subserved, at least in part, by interoceptive signals, and that individuals with high interoceptive
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sensitivity are therefore particularly susceptible to modulation of memory-confidence by the
disgust-cue.
Although we were unable to index subjects on their interoceptive sensitivity owing to the
online nature of this study, we were able to query subjects on their beliefs regarding their
interoceptive sensitivity. Following the cue-face detection task, we surveyed subjects on their
interoceptive beliefs using a “body awareness” questionnaire (adapted from Porges, 2018). The
survey included 12 interoceptive sensations as prompts (e.g. “stomach and gut pain”), and
queried subjects on their awareness of these sensations (from being “never” to “always” aware,
with three intermediate options). Answers to all twelve questions were used to generate bodyawareness scores for each subject.
Data Pre-Processing
332/10297 trials were removed due to being associated with an excessively long cue
duration (>40ms). Participants experienced >40ms cue-durations on an average of 3.39 trials (SD
= 5.9 trials). Furthermore, 661/10297 trials were removed due to being associated with a nondecision on the integrated recognition and confidence question. In Experiment 3, once again, a
non-decision corresponded with the subject not moving the slider within the five-second timelimit. On average, participants failed to make a decision on an average of 6.74 trials (SD = 10 .57
trials)
Hypothesis Testing
Mixed-effect modelling of trial-level performance was identical to Experiments 1 and 2.
With regards to mixed-effect modelling of individual participant statistics (d’ etc.) we were
interested in an additional parameter: Body-Score. As such, we initially fit mixed-effects models
with four main-effects (Detection-d’, Body-Score, Disgust-Awareness and Cue-Affect). We
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proceeded to fit a model with that included three two-way interaction terms (all two-way
interactions between cue-affect and other by-sparticipant variables), to interrogate whether any
of these variables moderated the effect of the disgust-cue on subject performance.
Results
Individual Participant Analyses of Prime Detection
On the disgust-face detection follow-up experiment, subjects’ mean d’ was 0.66
(SD=.76). A one-sample t-test revealed that the sample Detection-d’ mean was significantly
different from 0, t(87)= 8.24, p<.001.
Following the memory test, 10 subjects reported having had seen a face in a “disgust”
expression during the multi-option query of cue awareness. Of these 10 subjects, none selected
on the option correspond to “disgust” without also selecting options corresponding to incorrect
lures (“surprised,” “happy,” etc.)
Individual Participant Analyses of Memory Recognition and Metamemory Performance
Outlier exclusion led to the removal of one subject prior to calculation of d’ means, three
subjects prior to calculation of c-criterion means, and 14 subjects prior to calculation of metad’/d’ means. There was no significant difference in d’ between disgust-cue (M= 1.13, SEM=.07)
and neutral-cue trials (M=1.05, SEM=.07), t(86)= 1.30, p= 0.20 [Figure 8A]. Likewise, there was
no significant difference in c-criterion between disgust-cue (M=-0.11, SEM=0.04) and neutralcue trials (M=-0.14, SEM=0.04), t(84)=1.16, p=.25 [Figure 8B]. Finally, turning to metamemory
performance, there was no differences in meta-d’/d’ between disgust-cue (M=0.44, SEM=0.18)
and neutral-cue trials (M=0.00, SEM=0.46), t(73)=0.98, p=.33 [Figure 8C].
Regression modelling of individual participant performance statistics was carried-out in
an analogous fashion as Experiments 1 and 2. The only difference was that a new parameter,
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Body-Score, was included within exploratory models. As shown in Table A7, two-way
interaction terms between Cue-Affect and either Body-Score, Detection-d’, Disgust-Awareness
failed to improve model-fit for any parameter. In the model predicting d’, the main-effect
Detection-d’ was shown to explain a significant amount of the variance (β=.54, p=.024). In
Experiment 3, the main-effect Detection-d’ also explained a significant amount of the variance in
the model predicting c-criterion (β= -.23, p=.013). Therefore, perceptual discrimination of the
affective-cue was associated with a relatively liberal criterion on memory-test blocks (e.g., an
increased likelihood of declaring targets to be old, regardless of accuracy).

Figure 8: Experiment 3. Neutral versus Disgust Difference in by-participant Statistics of TaskPerformance, (A) There were no differences in discrimination (d’) for neutral vs. disgust faces. (B)
There were no differences in recognition criterion (c-criterion) for neutral vs. disgust faces. (C) There
were no differences in metacognitive efficiency (meta-d’/d’) for neutral vs. disgust faces.

Trial-level Analyses of Memory Recognition Performance
As was the case for Experiments 1 and 2, the best-fitting model predicting Trial-Success
included all four candidate parameters (Item-History, Cue-Affect, Confidence, and PerceivedFace-Fit) [Table A8]. This best-fitting model included one significant main-effect: Confidence
(β=1.01, <.001). There were also two significant two-way interactions, Confidence*Item-History
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(β=1.01, <.017) and Item-History*Perceived-Face-Fits (β=1.80, <.001), and one significant
three-way interaction Confidence*Cue-Affect*Item-History (β=.99, p=.021).
To better understand the Item-History*Confidence*Cue-Affect interaction, we examined
intact and rearranged trials separately [Figure 9]. For intact pairs, there was a similar confidenceaccuracy relationship for neutral- and disgust-cue trials [Figure 9B]. However, for rearranged
trials, there was a different confidence-accuracy relationship for neutral- and disgust- cue trials
[Figure 9A], such that higher confidence was associated with higher accuracy, and lower
confidence was associated with lower accuracy for disgust compared to neutral cue trials. In
other words, Item-History moderated the influence of Cue-Affect on metacognitive sensitivity, or
the extent to which concurrent judgements of confidence correlated with first-order accuracy, but
only for rearranged trials.

Figure 9: Experiment 3. Interaction between Item-History and Confidence, A: For rearranged trials the
disgust prime was associated with better metacognitive sensitivity than the neutral prime. B: For intact
trials, no difference in metacognitive sensitivity was observed between neutral and disgust maskedaffective cues
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Discussion
Since error-monitering mechanisms are hypothesized to be embodied (Ullsperger et al.,
2010) and depend on post-decisional evidence accumulation (Rabbitt & Vyas, 1981), we
hypothesized that subliminal arousal arriving before response-selection would not be attributed
as error. The results from Experiment 3 support this hypothesis, as subliminal arousal was shown
to inflate estimates of decision-confidence in a subset of trials [Figure 9A]. For rearranged trials,
more specifically, the masked-affective cue was shown to increase confidence ratings for correct
responses and decrease it for incorrect responses.
Extending from a relativistic predictive-coding framework, we hypothesize that predictions of
accuracy during decision-making were biased towards uncertainty and that subliminal arousal
offset this negative bias. This hypothesis is consistent with the observation that the effect of
arousal on confidence was constrained to rearranged trials, which were likely associated with
higher baseline estimates of uncertainty owing to their associated lack of familiarity evidence
(Yonelinas et al., 1996). The notion that subliminal arousal offset expectations of decisionuncertainty in Experiment 3 is furthermore consistent with the theory that performancemonitoring during decision-making is driven by a dedicated “conflict-monitoring” system Yeung
et al., 2004). Since this system is thought to generate online predictions of volatility it is likely
biased or uncertainty (Ullsperger et al., 2010).
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General Discussion
Across experiments, our data support the view that unexpected arousal has an effect on
cognitive decisions; the type of effect depends on timing and may also relate to task
expectations. When unexpected arousal preceded face-name recognition (Exp. 1), arousal offset
the influence of heuristic evidence on signal-based memory, or familiarity (Goldinger & Hansen,
2005). This relative suppression is consistent with the view that arousal signals prediction-error
(e.g., Arousal Prediction-Error, see Seth, 2013; Seth & Friston, 2016). However, when
unexpected arousal preceded the retrospective confidence judgment (Exp. 2), expectations
relevant to confidence were suppressed by Arousal Prediction-Error. Furthermore, consistent
with a predictive-coding framework, the masked disgust-face was shown to offset internal
expectations in a task-specific, relativistic manner. The effects of arousal on familiarity (Exp. 1)
were specific to faces that were judged to “fit” their given name at encoding, and the effects of
arousal on confidence (Exp. 2) were specific to intact face-name pairs that were holistically rated
as “good-fits.” In both cases, this was likely because “good-fits” at encoding were associated
with expectations of high familiarity and/or high certainty. When recognition and confidence
were given as an integrated judgment, unexpected arousal was shown to inflate rather than
suppress estimates of decision-making certainty. Once again, the effect of arousal was relativistic
as it was constrained to the subset of rearranged trials, which was likely associated with higher
baseline predictions of uncertainty than the subset of intact trials.
Arousal Offsets Relativistic Expectations during Mnemonic Decision-Making
Bayesian systems are driven by the dynamic weighting of generative expectations, or
priors, against incoming evidence (Yon & Frith, 2021). Extending from this, Arousal PredictionError is hypothesized to suppress expectations in a relativistic manner (Allen et al., 2016). Our
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results support this hypothesis. Across all experiments, the masked-affective cue produced
relative offsets in memory or confidence behavior within a constrained subset of trials. Critically,
the relevant subset of trials was likely associated with divergent memory or certainty predictions
and subliminal arousal suppressed these divergent predictions.
In Experiments 1 and 2, the effects of arousal were specific to face-name pairs that were
rated as “good-fits” at encoding, likely because “good-fit” pairs were associated relatively high
expectations of memory and certainty. Although we did not directly manipulate expectations of
memory and certainty, it is reasonable to think that “good-fit faces” were associated with greater
perceptual fluency which evoked feelings of familiarity (Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; Rajaram,
1993). While viewing faces, subjects are known to infer typicality depending on factors such as
gender (Vokey & Read, 1988), ethnicity (Meissner & Brigham, 2001), and feature geometry
(Bartlett et al., 1984). Critically, typical faces are processed more easily (Vokey & Read, 1992)
and are furthermore stereotyped to “fit” common first-names (Zwebner et al., 2017). In our
experiment, subjectively “typical” faces may have been associated with perceptual fluency and
an a priori expectation of being “good-fits” for common first-names (especially as we employed
the 100 most common male and female birth names in 1990 in our study). Ultimately, however,
our experiment was not designed to explore the moderating role of face-typicality on memory.
Future research should investigate whether the known influence of typicality on familiarity is
moderated by physiological cues.
Turning to the effects of unexpected arousal on memory and confidence, and assuming
that “good-fit” face-name pairs were associated with expectations of familiarity and certainty,
our data are consistent with the Arousal-Prediction Error hypothesis (Seth, 2013). In
Experiments 1 and 2, the Face-Fits parameter was associated with an “illusion of memory”
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effect (Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989). Thus, “good-fit faces” were associated with relatively high
expectations of memory, as evidenced by a bias to endorse face-name pairs as intact. In Exp. 1,
the masked disgust-face suppressed this liberal memory-criterion. In this case, because
expectations of familiarity were high, unexpected arousal was likely misattributed to memory
prediction-error.
In Experiment 2, “good-fit faces” were once again associated with an increase in
accuracy for intact trials (liberal criterion-shift), and the subset of intact “good-fit face” trials was
therefore associated with a relatively high rate of first-order recognition accuracy. The maskedaffective cue arrived before retrospective judgements of confidence and reduced estimates of
decision-certainty within this subset. More specifically, the masked disgust-face reduced
confidence for high-accuracy trials and increased it for low-accuracy trials. Given this pattern of
results, we inferred that the masked-affective cue suppressed heuristic evidence of decisioncertainty associated with this subset of intact “good-fit face” trials.
This inference derives from the known influence of heuristics such as decision-time on
retrospective confidence (Koriat & Ackerman, 2009). Critically, decision-time has been shown
to correlate with first-order accuracy (e.g., at the multi-trial level) while still producing linear
shifts in confidence for both correct and incorrect trials (Kiani et al., 2014). Following from this,
we inferred that arousal likely suppressed a heuristic source of evidence that was associated with
the high-accuracy subset of intact “good-fit” face trials, but whose influence on confidence was
nonetheless distinct from that of first-order memory-strength and/or accuracy. This would
account for the symmetric reduction in decision-certainty for both intact and rearranged
responses. The specific heuristic may have pertained to the relative rapidity, accessibility, or
fluency of decision-making while subjects viewed “good-fit” face-name pairs (Koriat, 2012;
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Koriat & Ackerman, 2009). Generally, we are not certain which heuristic or set of heuristics
were involved, and we recommend that future research investigate the influence of
metacognitive heuristics during associative face-name recognition
Finally, in Experiment 3, the masked-affective cue was shown to inflate confidence for
high-accuracy trials and reduce confidence for low-accuracy trials. This effect was constrained to
the subset of rearranged trials. Following a relativistic predictive-coding framework, we inferred
that rearranged cues were associated with higher baseline estimates of uncertainty than “intact”
trials. This inference is supported by Dual-Process theory, as familiarity processes are theorized
to facilitate accurate detection of intact but not rearranged pairs (Yonelinas et al., 1999). As such,
we inferred that subliminal arousal offset an uncertainty bias associated with rearranged trials.
Furthermore, since arousal influenced concurrent judgements of confidence in
Experiment 3, the direction of prediction-error is consistent with the theory that decision-making
is accompanied by “conflict-monitoring” systems that provide online estimates of task-challenge
(Ullsperger et al., 2010). As such, concurrent predictions of decision-confidence were likely
biased towards volatility, or uncertainty, and arousal may have offset the influence of a negative
prediction bias on confidence.
Timing of Arousal Determines Whether it is Attributed to Memory or Error
During perception of recognition cues, transient shifts in arousal accompany familiaritybased recognition and are hypothesized to facilitate recollection of contextual information
(Morris et al., 2008). After decision-making, furthermore, transient shifts in arousal coincide
with error-awareness (Veen et al., 2004; Wessel et al., 2011) and are hypothesized to facilitate
effortful responses to the source of error (Critchley et al., 2005; Notebaert et al., 2009). During
mnemonic decision-making, therefore, transient shifts in arousal are likely attributed to either
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familiarity or error depending on the timing of the shift with respect to the recognition
judgement. More specifically, earlier shifts during cue-processing are likely attributed to
familiarity (Goldinger & Hansen, 2005), whereas later shifts during post-response epoch are
likely attributed to decision-error (Klein et al., 2007; Ullsperger et al., 2010).
Experiments 1 and 2 support this hypothesis. Critically, the only difference between these
experiments was the timing of the masked-affective cue. By timing the cue to precede
recognition, we observed an effect of the masked disgust-face on familiarity (Exp. 1).
Alternatively, by delaying the cue to come after recognition, we observed an effect of the
masked-disgust face on confidence (Exp. 2). Once again, the effect on confidence was not
moderated by first-order differences in memory-strength, which suggests that arousal was
perhaps misattributed to meta-level predictions of decision-error. As such, our data afford novel
insight into the embodied nature of both familiarity and error-monitoring processes during
mnemonic decision-making.
Arousal Modulates Internal Models of Uncertainty
In Experiment 2, we inferred that internal error-monitoring systems mediated the
influence of arousal on suppression of decision-certainty (e.g., on error-prediction). Since these
systems depend on evidence accumulation during the post-decisional epoch (Kiani et al., 2014;
Yeung & Summerfield, 2012), we hypothesized that arousal would not be attributed as error if it
was timed to influence a judgement of confidence provided during rather than after responseselection. We tested this hypothesis by combining recognition and confidence judgments into a
single question in Experiment 3 (two-sided confidence response). Instead of suppressing
decision-making certainty (e.g., attribution of arousal to error), the disgust-face was instead
associated with a symmetric inflation of confidence for both correct and incorrect responses.
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Taken together, therefore, Experiments 2 and 3 suggest that performance-monitoring predictions
are biased towards uncertainty during decision-making and certainty after response-selection.
Once again, the uncertainty bias in Experiment 3 may reflect the extent to which
decision-making is accompanied by a distinct “conflict-monitoring” system (Ullsperger et al.,
2010; Yeung et al., 2004). This system is thought to generate online predictions of task-challenge
(Yeung & Summerfield, 2012). Following the relativistic framework of Arousal PredictionError, therefore, subliminal arousal may have been attributed as a violation uncertainty
monitoring and therefore as a relative shift towards certainty.
On the other hand, the certainty bias in Experiment 2 may reflect post-decisional
evidence accumulation in favor of the chosen decision. This bias is well-described by sequential
sampling models (drift-diffusion models etc.), as the drift of evidence towards a choice is
inferred to continue even after response selection (Kiani et al., 2014). Post-decisional evidence
accumulation in favor of the chosen response extends to mnemonic decision-making (Bornstein
& Zickafoose). Indeed, retrospective confidence is unlikely to be based on an equal balancing of
evidence corresponding to chosen and unchosen responses, as it correlates more strongly with
the strength of evidence favoring the chosen response (Hanczakowski et al., 2021). Furthermore,
retrospective memory confidence has been shown to correlate more strongly with response to the
chosen option (Chua & Solinger, 2015). Given this evidence, we hypothesize that post-decisional
arousal in Experiment 2 was attributed as a violation of evidence favoring the chosen response,
and therefore as a “change of mind” or error signal (Yeung et al., 2004).
Limitations
Across all experiments, the masked disgust-face was shown to modulate subjects’
internal predictions of memory or decision-confidence. We inferred that the masked-affective

51

face produced subliminal arousal and that subjects misattributed arousal to task-relevant
predictions. However, the strength of this misattribution hypothesis is undermined by the
possibility of subjects being aware of the masked disgust-face during test. This possibility was
supported by results from the follow-up task that directly tested subjects’ perceptual
discrimination of masked-affective faces.
Although the possibility of cue liminality was diminished by subjects’ general inability to
accurately report awareness of the disgust-face after memory-test, this possibility remains a
limitation of this experiment. Ultimately, owing to the online nature of this study, we were
unable to control for all factors influencing cue-liminality. Indeed, although we were able to
derive cue-duration estimates using internal computer feedback, these estimates did not account
for variability in duration caused by hardware issues such as the issue of image persistence on
older-generation LCD monitors (Elze, 2010). However, there is no reason to think that the
severity of hardware problems varied between neutral and disgust trial subsets. As such, this
issue is unlikely to have confounded the effect of the masked disgust-face on memory and
metamemory performance.
To more precisely overcome this concern, we recommend replicating Experiments 1-3
using an in-person design. Furthermore, an in-lab replication should measure transient changes in
physiological arousal using either electrodermal or pupillometric techniques. This way,
experimenters will be able to validate whether the masked-affective cue produces subliminal
arousal on a by-trial basis. Furthermore, experimenters may be able to test whether graded
differences in the magnitude of arousal predict the extent to which expectations are suppressed,
as graded differences in autonomic signals are thought to be relevant to behavioral control
(Mridha et al., 2021).
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Future Directions
Future experiments should investigate the relevance of emotion to embodied predictionerror. Indeed, Seth (2013) and Barrett (2015) integrate predictive-coding with longstanding
appraisal theories of emotion to propose that attribution of arousal to emotion may serve to
motivate appropriate responses to prediction-error (e.g., changing the world to fit one’s internal
model). Therefore, given how familiarity and uncertainty reflect distinct sources of taskchallenge (Critchley et al., 2005; Morris et al., 2008; Öhman, 1979), we infer that attribution of
arousal to familiarity and uncertainty is accompanied by distinct changes in affective state.
Indeed, although subjects are naïve to the internal dynamics of Bayesian models (Yon & Frith,
2021), emotion may provide a conscious interface for identifying the source of prediction-error
and taking deliberate actions to diminish it (Barrett & Simmons, 2015).
Predictive dynamics relevant to memory recognition are associated with feelings of
familiarity (Whittlesea & Leboe, 2003; Whittlesea & Williams, 2001). The feeling is thought to
be embodied (Morris et al., 2008) and reflect probabilistic estimates of memory (Yonelinas &
Jacoby, 1994). As such one may come to feel as though an item or person is familiar, or “Old,”
even if one cannot recollect contextual information concerning the prior encounter (Mandler,
1980; Tulving, 1985).
Similarly, mistakes in decision-making tasks are retrospectively associated with fastautomatic feelings of error (Rabbitt et al., 1978; Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977). Feelings of errorawareness are likewise thought to be embodied (Critchley et al., 2005) as error-detection
correlates with transient physiological changes (Veen et al., 2004; Wessel et al., 2011) and
activity in the Anterior Insular Cortex (AIC), which is known to integrate interoceptive and
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cognitive signals. However, error-awareness has mostly been studied in the context of perception
(Yeung & Summerfield, 2012), and its relevance to memory is not well understood.
Previous studies hint at the relevance of an embodied error-monitoring system to memory
metacognition, or metamemory. In the first place, cognition during retrospective memory
confidence was shown to correlate with activity in AIC (Chua et al., 2006). In the second place,
the accuracy of individuals’ retrospective confidence judgments was shown to correlate with
their interoceptive accuracy (Chua & Bliss-Moreau, 2016). Given these past findings, we
propose executing an experiment that tests whether the observed correlation between
retrospective confidence and activity in AIC (Chua et al., 2006) is moderated by transient shifts
in arousal and feelings of error.
Closing Remarks
These data afford novel insight into the relevance of Bayesian predictive coding to
memory and metamemory. We show that predictions relevant to familiarity and confidence are
susceptible embodied prediction-error signals. Furthermore, we show that the timing of
unexpected arousal (before or after response-selection) determines whether it is attributed to
familiarity or confidence (Experiments 1 and 2). Finally, we show that arousal suppresses
different predictions during concurrent and retrospective confidence (Experiments 2 and 3). This
difference may reflect the extent to which concurrent and retrospective confidence are influenced
by different performance monitoring systems (e.g., “conflict-monitoring” vs. “error-detection”).
Future work should investigate whether the observed correlation between arousal and
metamemory prediction-error is moderated by changes in affective-state and Insular activity.
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Appendix
Tables Pertaining to Experiment 1
Table A1: Parameter Selection on mixed-effects models predicting individual participant statistics (d’, c-criterion, meta d’/d’).
The best-fitting models are emboldened.
Mixed-Effects Models that Predict Individual participant Statistics

AIC

R2

Conditional R2

D’ ~ Cue-Affect

277.57

0.001

0.734

D’ ~ Cue-Affect + Detection-d’

262.43

0.177

0.735

D’ ~ Cue-Affect + Detection-d’+ Cue-Affect*Detection-d’

266.41

0.180

0.738

C-criterion ~ Cue-Affect

89.77

0.031

0.805

C-criterion ~ Cue-Affect + Detection-d’

93.82

0.031

0.805

C-criterion ~ Cue-Affect + Detection-d + Cue-Affect *Detection-d’

100.71

0.031

0.804

Meta-d’/d’~ Cue-Affect

788.01

0.002

0.018

Meta-d’/d’~ Cue-Affect + Detection-d + Cue-Affect

789.13

0.013

0.025

Meta-d’/d’~ Cue-Affect + Detection-d + Cue-Affect *Detection-d’

788.48

0.027

0.045
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Table A2: AIC model-fit parameters associated with a family of logistic mixed-effects model that predict Trial-Success at the
group-level.

Trial-Success ~ Fixed-Effects

AIC

R2

Conditional R2

Success ~ Disgust

13328

<.001

.062

Success ~ Disgust*Confidence

12410

0.114

0.173

Success ~ Disgust*Confidence*Item-History

12239

0.143

0.201

Success ~ Disgust*Confidence*Item-History*Face-Fits

12178

0.156

0.214

Table A3: Experiment 1. Displays AIC model-fit statistics for mixed-effects model that predict Trial-Success at the group-level, and
for stratified subsets of the data. 3A: Face-Fit trials, shaded in beige, 3B: No Face-Fit trials, shaded in red. The best-fitting models
are emboldened.

Face-Fits Stratum

AIC

R2

Conditional R2

Success ~ Disgust

8500.2

0

.072

Success ~ Disgust*Confidence

7873.7

.129

.199

Success ~ Disgust*Confidence*Item-History

7637.3

.190

.255

No Face-Fit Stratum

AIC

R2

Conditional R2

Success ~ Disgust

4873.4

0

.039

Success ~ Disgust*Confidence

4585.5

0.103

0.144

Success ~ Disgust*Confidence*Item-History

4588.7

0.105

0.146
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Tables Pertaining to Experiment 2
Table A4: Parameter Selection on mixed-effects models predicting individual participant statistics (d’, c-criterion, meta d’/d’). The
best-fitting models are emboldened.

Mixed-Effects Models that Predict Individual participant Statistics

AIC

R2

Conditional R2

D’ ~ Cue-Affect

297.23

0.002

0.681

D’ ~ Cue-Affect + Detection-d’ + Disgust-Awareness

302.23

0.015

0.688

D’ ~ Cue-Affect + Detection-d’ +Disgust-Awareness + Cue-Affect*Detection-d’ +

308.50

0.016

0.684

C-criterion ~ Cue-Affect

95.58

0.000

0.901

C-criterion ~ Cue-Affect + Detection-d’ + Disgust-Awareness

101.70

0.016

0.903

C-criterion ~ Cue-Affect + Detection-d’+ Disgust-Awareness + Cue-

111.39

0.017

0.902

Meta-d’/d’~ Cue-Affect

670.36

0.009

0.133

Meta-d’/d’~ Cue-Affect + Detection-d’ + Disgust-Awareness

671.27

0.018

0.146

Meta-d’/d’~ Cue-Affect + Detection-d’ +Disgust-Awareness + Cue-

670.77

0.021

0.139

Cue-Affect* Disgust-Awareness

Affect*Detection-d’ + Cue-Affect* Disgust-Awareness

Affect*Detection-d’ + Cue-Affect* Disgust-Awareness
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Table A5: AIC model-fit parameters associated with a family of logistic mixed-effects model that predict Trial-Success at the grouplevel. The best-fitting model is emboldened.
Trial-Success ~ Fixed-Effects

AIC

R2

Conditional R2

Success ~ Disgust

11671.95

<.001

.068

Success ~ Disgust*Confidence

11148.30

0.081

0.161

Success ~ Disgust*Confidence*Item-History

10931.66

0.110

0.180

Success ~ Disgust*Confidence* Item-History *Face-Fits

10841.11

0.131

0.200

Table A6: Experiment 2. Displays AIC model-fit statistics for mixed-effects model that predict Trial-Success at the group-level, and
for stratified subsets of the data. 3A: Face-Fit trials, shaded in beige, 3B: No Face-Fit trials, shaded in red

Face-Fits Stratum

AIC

R2

Conditional R2

Success ~ Disgust

7357.00

<.001

.072

Success ~ Disgust*Confidence

6963.07

0.098

.183

Success ~ Disgust*Confidence*Intact Target

6660.34

0.178

.232

No Face-Fit Stratum

AIC

R2

Conditional R2

Success ~ Disgust

4352.71

<0.001

.065

Success ~ Disgust*Confidence

4230.97

0.052

.087

Success ~ Disgust*Confidence*Intact Target

4234.02

0.054

.096
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Tables Pertaining to Experiment 3
Table A7: Parameter Selection on mixed-effects models predicting individual participant statistics. The best-fitting models are
emboldened
Mixed-Effects Models that Predict Individual participant Statistics

AIC

R2

Conditional R2

D’ ~ Cue-Affect

322.35

0.004

0.629

D’ ~ Cue-Affect + Detection-d’+ Disgust-Awareness + Body-Score

334.38

0.075

0.643

D’ ~ Cue-Affect + Detection-d’ +Disgust-Awareness+ Body-Score + Cue-

352.05

0.080

0.644

C-criterion ~ Cue-Affect

86.57

0.001

0.836

C-criterion ~ Cue-Affect + Detection-d’+ Disgust-Awareness + Body-Score

101.10

0.083

0.841

C-criterion ~ Cue-Affect + Detection-d’ +Disgust-Awareness+ Body-Score + Cue-

124.23

0.085

0.841

Meta-d’/d’~ Cue-Affect

757.13

0.005

0.224

Meta-d’/d’~ Cue-Affect + Detection-d + Disgust-Awareness + Body-Score

764.60

0.034

0.243

Meta-d’/d’~ Cue-Affect + Detection-d’ +Disgust-Awareness+ Body-Score + Cue-

771.59

0.042

0.239

Affect*Detection-d’ + Cue-Affect* Disgust-Awareness + Cue-Affect*Body-Score

Affect*Detection-d’ + Cue-Affect* Disgust-Awareness + Cue-Affect*Body-Score

Affect*Detection-d’ + Cue-Affect* Disgust-Awareness + Cue-Affect*Body-Score
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Table A8: AIC model-fit parameters associated with a family of logistic mixed-effects model that predict Trial-Success at the grouplevel. The best-fitting model is emboldened

Trial-Success ~ Fixed-Effects

AIC

R2

Conditional R2

Success ~ Disgust

10889.72

<.001

0.060

Success ~ Disgust*Confidence

10941.19

0.082

0.123

Success ~ Disgust*Confidence*Item Hist

11014.84

0.101

.166

Success ~ Disgust*Confidence*Intact Target*Face-Fits

11523.32

0.116

.194
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